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CASE COMMENTS
Admiralty
Now
THE

To

Law-RULE OF DIVIDED DAMAGES-LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
BE APPORTIONED AMONG THE PARTIES IN PROPORTION TO

COMPARATIVE

DEGREE

OF

FAULT.-United

States v. Reliable

Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
On a clear and windy night in December 1968, the tanker Mary A.
Whalen ran aground off Rockaway Point, New York. The vessel's
owner, the Reliable Transfer Company, brought an action against
the United States in federal district court, charging that the Coast
Guard had negligently failed to maintain a breakwater light at the
mouth of Rockaway Inlet, and seeking to recover damages sustained
by the Whalen in the grounding. The district court found that the
stranding was caused 25 percent by the negligence of the Coast Guard
and 75 percent by faulty management and navigation of the Whalen.
The court held, however, that since both parties were negligent, the
admiralty rule of divided damages required that each bear half of
the loss sustained by the vessel.' Following an affirmance of the judgment by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,' the United
States Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Stewart, that in cases of maritime collision or stranding the
divided damages rule should be replaced by a rule allocating liability
for property damage in proportion to the comparative degree of fault
of the parties.
The decision ended the 120-year reign of a rule of damages that
has often been criticized for producing unjust results4 and that has
been peculiar to United States maritime law for several decades. The
United States inherited the rule from the British admiralty courts, 5
1. The divided damages rule was established in United States admiralty law in
The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854). The rule was
applied in cases of collision between two or more vessels where both vessels were at
fault. Id. at 177. In such cases, "the sums representing the damage sustained by each
must be added together and the aggregate divided between the two. This is in effect
deducting the lesser from the greater and dividing the remainder." The Sapphire, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 51, 56 (1873). Accord, The "Atlas," 93 U.S. 302, 313 (1876); The "North
Star," 106 U.S. 17, 22 (1822).
United States admiralty courts have also applied the divided damages rule in noncollision cases where the vessel is damaged through the mutual fault of the vessel and
a nonvessel party. White Oak Transp. Co. v. Boston, Cape Cod & N.Y. Canal Co., 258
U.S. 341 (1922) (grounding in canal); Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1874)
(barge striking pier).
2. Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974).
3. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
4. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text infra.
5. The origin of the rule is generally traced to article XIV of the Laws of Oleron
(circa A.D. 1150). For a brief history of the rule's development and transfer from Britain
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but the United Kingdom repudiated the rule by ratifying the Brussels
Collision Liability Convention of 1910.6 The United States is the only

major maritime nation that has failed either to ratify or to adhere to
the Convention,' a divergence which has resulted in international
forum shopping., In recent years the divided damages rule has drawn
severe criticism from the lower federal courts9 and legal commentators." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and especially
Judge Learned Hand, have been frequent critics of the rule; nevertheless, despite minor attempts at rebellion," the courts have felt that,
to the United States, see Sprague, Divided Damages, 6 N.Y.U.L. REv. 15 (1928). See also
R. MARSDEN, THE LAW OF COLLISIONS AT SEA 108-15 (1lth ed. K. McGuffie 1961) (4 BRITISH
SHIPPING LAWS); Staring,
Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and
Maritime Cases, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 304 (1957).

6. The text of the Convention may be found at 6 A. KNAUtm & C. KNAuTH, KNAtrn's
39 (7th ed. rev. 1969). Article 4 of the Convention provides for
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apportionment of liability for damages according to the degree of fault. It also eliminates
joint and several liability of colliding vessels to third persons.
7. The nations which have ratified or adhered to the Convention are: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Newfoundland,
New Zealand, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Following
World War II, Japan and both Germanies rejoined the Convention. See id. at 38-39.
8. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 529 (2d ed. 1975). See also
Huger, The ProportionalDamage Rule in Collisions at Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1928).
The adoption of the proportional liability rule will not remedy the forum shopping
problem; even though United States courts will now measure liability by the same
rule as foreign courts, actual awards will often differ because of differing systems for
limitation of liability. See note 25 and accompanying text infra. See also Isbrandtsen Co.
v. Lloyd Brasiliero Patrimonio Nacional, 85 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); G. ROBINSON,
HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALITY LAW 826 (1939).
9. See, e.g., Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954);
and both the district court and court of appeals opinions in In re Adams' Petition, 125
F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), afj'd, 237 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 971
(1957). The position which the courts have taken was expressed by Chief Judge Goodrich in In re Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 289 F.2d 237, 241-42 (3d Cir. 1961):
It seems too bad that the Elna should be tarred with the same stick as the Mission
in this case. If we had a rule which divided responsibility in proportion to the
negligence of the parties, as is the case in many other countries, we could make
an equitable adjustment. But our American rule of even division of the damages
makes for some hard cases and this is one.
10. See, e.g., G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 528-31; Comment, The
Difficult Quest for a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure of the Brussels Conventions To
Achieve InternationalAgreement on Collision Liability, Liens, and Mortgages, 64 YALE L.J.
878, 903-05 (1955).
11. In The Margaret, 30 F.2d 923 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 862 (1929), the
court decreed a 75%-25% division of damages, but reversed itself upon rehearing and
reluctantly followed the divided damages rule. Similarly, in In re Adams' Petition, 125
F. Supp. 110, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), afj'd, 237 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 971 (1957), the trial court entered "Conclusions of Law," finding:
2. The Sandcraft was at fault to the extent of 80 per cent.
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in Judge Hand's words, "we have no power to divest ourselves of this
vestigial relic... "1 2 Judge Jerome Frank, a member of the same court,
agreed: "[W]e feel obliged to apply that rule until the Supreme Court
or Congress instructs us otherwise."'' 3 Since the decisions in all of the
lower federal courts were in harmony with the settled law, the Supreme
Court has had few recent occasions to review the rule.14 Thus "[t]he
rule of divided damages in admiralty has continued to prevail in this
country by sheer inertia rather than by reason of any intrinsic merit."' '
Faced with the obviously unjust results produced by the rule, the
unanimous opposition to it in the lower courts, and a record which
showed that the courts of other nations have successfully applied comparative negligence rules in admiralty, 16 the Reliable Transfer Court
found little difficulty in overturning the rule.
The decision helps remedy the problem of demonstrably unjust
awards, and moves United States admiralty law toward uniformity
with the rest of the world. It does not, however, fully achieve that
uniformity; hence it does not solve the problem of forum shopping.
Furthermore, it creates new problems in the area of recovery for cargo
damage. All of these problems result from statutes affecting shipowners' liability.
Every major maritime nation has some form of limitation of
liability law. 7 In the United States, the Limitation of Vessel Owner's
3. The Melrose was at fault to the extent of 20 per cent.
5. Decree accordingly.
Upon reargument, however, the court aquiesced in the Second Circuit's mandate that
the divided damages rule be followed. 125 F. Supp. at 115.
12. Oriental Trading & Transp. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 173 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir.
1949).
13. Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 1954).
14. The Court granted certiorari in Union Oil Co. v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S.
140 (1972), for the purpose of reviewing the divided damages rule. The issue was, however, precluded when the Court determined that only one of the parties was at fault.
See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 403 n.4 (1975).
15. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 410 (1975).
16. See Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333,
349-51 (1932). See also Franck, A New Law for the Seas, 42 L.Q. REv. 25 (1926); Scott,
Collisions at Sea Where Both Ships Are in Fault, 13 L.Q. REv. 17 (1897). The Reliable
Transfer Court also noted that American courts have applied a comparative negligence
rule "with no untoward difficulties in personal injury actions." 421 U.S. at 407.
17. The three basic forms of limitation of liability are described in Eyer, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability-New Directions for an Old Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REv.
370 (1964):
(1) The German system, which placed no liability on the owners but subjected
the ship to an in rem action; (2) the French system of abandon, under which
the owner, although personally liable, could discharge his obligations by releasing
the ship and freight to the claimants; and (3) the English system of limiting
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Liability Act"' allows a shipowner to limit his liability for property
damage to the value of the vessel at the end of the voyage and pending
freight. 19 Thus if a vessel sinks and is a total loss, her liability for
property damage may be virtually nonexistent."
The limitation of liability statute was originally enacted to encourage the shipping industry. 21 In recent years it has been critically
characterized as a subsidy paid by injured parties rather than by the
public treasury. 22 During the 1960's several attempts were made to
amend the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act or to eliminate
it altogether. 2 3 Despite the failure of these attempts, the future of the
the shipowner's liability to the value of the ship, measured before the infliction of
the damage.
Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted).
18. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1970). Section 183 provides in relevant part:
(a) The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign,
for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods,
or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or
injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture,
done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner
or owners, shall not, except in the cases provided for in subsection (b) of this
section, exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel,
and her freight then pending.
(b) In the case of any seagoing vessel, if the amount of the owner's liability as
limited under subsection (a) of this section is insufficient to pay all losses in full,
and the portion of such amount applicable to the payment of losses in respect
of loss of life or bodily injury is less than $60 per ton of such vessel's tonnage,
such portion shall be increased to an amount equal to $60 per ton, to be available
only for the payment of losses in respect of loss of life or bodily injury. If such
portion so increased is insufficient to pay such losses in full, they shall be paid
therefrom in proportion to their respective amounts.
19. Since the principal impact of Reliable Transfer is in the area of property
damage, this comment will not deal with personal injury and wrongful death claims.
For such claims, however, the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act provides that
the limitation fund must contain a minimum of $60 per ton. See note 18 supra.
20. E.g., In re Baracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified,
409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969). In the American limitation proceeding following the
Torrey Canyon disaster, the limitation fund was set at $50-the value of a salvaged lifeboat. Id.
21. G. RoBINsoO, supra note 8, at 876-79.
22. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S.
409, 427 (1954). See also G. GILMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 821-24; Eyer, supra
note 17.
23. For a summary of the congressional action concerning the limitation act, see
Address by John F. Gerity, 1968 Annual Meeting of the Association of Average Adjusters
of the United States, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, ADMIRALTY: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS1969, at 38-39 (1969). The proposed amendments would have generally enacted the
provisions of the 1957 Brussels Convention on the Limitation of the Liability of the
Owners of Ships. The text of the 1957 Convention may be found in H. BAER, ADMIRALTY
LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT 562 (2d ed. 1969). The Convention requires that a limitation
fund be established for claims of property damage and personal injury. The property
damage portion of the fund equals approximately $67 per ton, and the personal injury
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limitation act appears dim. 24

The Reliable Transfer decision does not entirely solve the forum
shopping problem, since the protections offered by the Limitation of
Vessel Owner's Liability Act are not identical to those offered by other
nations' laws. The United Kingdom, for example, requires the shipowner to provide a statutory limitation fund for property damage as
well as for personal injury, with the limitation fund for personal injury considerably larger than that of the United States. 25 Thus in a
case in which the vessel was lost, claimants could collect far greater
awards by bringing their suits in a British court; conversely, confining
litigation to United States courts would be advantageous to the shipowners.
The most striking problem raised by the Reliable Transfer decision
concerns the right of cargo owners to recover for damages sustained
in both-to-blame collisions and groundings. Important in claims for
damage to cargo are the Harter Act 26 and the Carriage of Goods by

Sea Act (COGSA).2 7 These are not, strictly speaking, limitation
statutes, since they operate to relieve shipowners of liability rather
than to limit liability. 28 Nonetheless, they greatly restrict the ability of
portion of the fund equals approximately $140 per ton. If the personal injury portion is insufficient to satisfy all such claims, "the unpaid balance of such claims shall rank ratably
with the property claims for payment against the second [property damage] portion of
the fund." 1957 Brussels Convention in BAER, supra, at 564.
Shipping interests originally opposed the amendments, but reversed their position in
1961, apparently convinced that the alternative to the 1957 Convention would be no
limitation of liability at all. Gerity, supra, at 37-43. See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 8, at 823-24; Eyer, supra note 17. For reasons not readily apparent, the
amendments failed to pass. Perhaps various interests (cargo, passengers, seamen) felt
that the reforms were inadequate and withdrew their support.
24. The authors of a leading admiralty treatise suggest that "[o]ne more largescale maritime disaster, following which the shipowners petition to limit their liability
to a fund of $50, should suffice to bring the whole structure tumbling down." G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 823 (footnote omitted). The $50 fund refers to the Torrey
Canyon disaster. See note 20 supra.
25. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 (as amended by Act of 1958), 6 & 7 Eliz.
2, c. 62, reprinted in R. MARSDEN, supra note 5, at 135-36, is a statutory version of the
1957 Brussels Convention. See note 23 supra. The British limitation fund totals $207 per
ton, of which $67 is allocated for property damage, compared with the United States
limitation fund of $60 per ton, which is exclusively for personal claims. See note 18
supra.
26. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1970). See note 28 inIra.
27. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970). See note 28 infra.
28. G. ROBINSON, supra note 8, at 875. The relevant portion of the Harter Act is
46 U.S.C. § 192 (1970), which provides in part:
If the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from
any port in the United States of America shall exercise due diligence to make
the said vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and
supplied, neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agent, or charterers, shall
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cargo owners to recover for damages. The statutes provide that if a
vessel's owner has exercised due diligence to insure that the vessel is
seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage, he is not liable to the
owners of cargo carried by the vessel for damages caused by negligence
or mismanagement in navigation. COGSA and the Harter Act have
not been criticized as severely as the limitation act, perhaps because
29
they regulate primarily commercial, rather than personal, interests,
or because the courts have construed them to allow full recovery by
innocent cargo interests in the event of groundings or collisions in30
volving two negligent parties.
Although the Harter Act and COGSA relieve the vessel from
liability to the cargo it carries, United States courts have construed
the statutes to allow cargo full recovery for its losses in both-to-blame
collisions. 3 1 Prior to the passage of the Harter Act in 1893, the Supreme Court held that a cargo owner could receive a judgment for his
entire loss against either vessel if both were at fault.3 2 After the Harter
become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors.
in navigation or in the management of said vessel ....
The relevant portion of COGSA is 46 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970), which provides in part:
(1) Unseaworthiness.
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or
resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part
of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly
manned, equipped, and supplied, and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool
chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried fit and safe
for their reception, carriage, and preservation in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph (1) of section 1303 of this title. Whenever loss or damage has restilted from unseaworthiness the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence
shall be on the carrier or other persons claiming exemption under this section.
(2) Uncontrollable causes of loss.
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising
or resulting from(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the
carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship ....
COGSA superseded the Harter Act for the most part. For the purposes of this comment
they may be considered identical. For a comparison of the two statutes, see G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 147-49. COGSA is a statutory version of the Hague Convention
of 1924. The British statutory version of the Convention is the Carriage of Goods By
Sea Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22 (1924).
29. The purpose of COGSA and the Harter Act is to regulate cargo carriage by
regulating the terms of ocean bills of lading. 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1970). Thus the statutes
affect only the relationship between shipper and carrier. The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S.
540 (1899).
30. See notes 33-37 and accompanying text infra.
31. See generally L.
STATES 226-32 (1973).

BUGLASS,

MARINE

INSURANCE AND GENERAL AVERAGE

IN THE UNITED

32. The "Atlas," 93 U.S. 302 (1876); The "Alabama" & The "Game-cock," 92 U.S.
695 (1875). This contrasts with the British rule that was in effect prior to 1911. That
rule allowed recovery of no more than 50% of cargo loss from each vessel. Thus, if a
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Act eliminated recovery from the carrying ship, the Court held in The
33
that cargo could recover in full from the noncarrying
Chattahoochee
ship; the Court construed the act to affect only the contractual relationship between shipper and carrier, and not cargo's rights against third
persons. 34 Furthermore, the Court held the amount of the judgment
was to be added to the noncarrying vessel's damages before the division
of damages.35 The colliding vessels were in effect treated as joint tortfeasors with joint and several liability, and with equal contribution.
Shipowners have protested that this rule is contrary to the purpose and intent of the Harter Act and COGSA, 5 and that it creates
an anomaly in the law, since the carrying vessel may be held liable for
50 percent of cargo damage if its fault is slight, but may not be held
liable at all if it is solely at fault. The courts, reluctant to deny "innocent" cargo its right to recover, have not sympathized with this posi37
tion.
A strict reading of the Reliable Transfer holding" s would overturn
the Chattahoochee rule; it would appear that cargo could recover
bill of lading contained an exculpatory clause, the only recovery available was from
the noncarrying vessel in the amount of 50% of sustained loss. The Milan, 167 Eng.
Rep. 167 (1861).
33. 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
34. Id. at 555.
35. Id. at 551-54.
36. See Comment, supra note 10, at 881-82. This frustration of congressional intent
was one of the reasons advanced for ratification of the 1910 Brussels Convention. Id.
at 890 n.64. Cargo interests, however, persuaded the Senate not to ratify the 1910 Convention. G. ROBINSON, supra note 8, at 854; Staring, supra note 5.
37. In United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952), the Supreme
Court invalidated both-to-blame clauses in bills of lading. These clauses required
cargo owners to indemnify the carrying vessel for any additional losses resulting from
application of the Chattahoochee rule. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
Petitioner argues that the clause does nothing more than remove an "anomaly"
which arises from this Court's construction of the Harter Act. It is said to be
"anomalous" to hold a carrier not liable at all if it alone is guilty of negligent
navigation but at the same time to hold it indirectly liable for one-half the cargo
damages if another ship is jointly negligent with it. Assuming for the moment
that all rules of law must be symmetrical, we think it would be "anomalous"
to hold that a cargo owner, who has an unquestioned right under the law to
recover full damages from a noncarrying vessel, can be compelled to give up a
portion of that recovery to his carrier because of a stipulation exacted in a bill
of lading. Moreover, there is no indication that either the Harter Act or the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was designed to alter the long-established rule that
the full burden of the losses sustained by both ships in a both-to-blame collision
is to be shared equally.
Id. at 241-42.
38. "We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to
cause property damage in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage
is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their
fault .... " United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
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only that proportion of the damage attributable to the noncarrying
vessel, as the Hatter Act and COGSA would prevent cargo from recovering from the carrying vessel.39 Thus, in replacing the well-settled
but unjust divided damages rule, the Court may have eliminated the
equally well-settled principle that cargo may recover its full damages
in a both-to-blame collision.
Such a construction of the Reliable Transfer holding is unlikely,
however. Cargo's right to recover is firmly established in the American
legal system, and has been frequently articulated and defended by the
courts. 40 Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the
Harter Act and COGSA neither operate to defeat cargo's right to recover in a both-to-blame collision, 41 nor authorize provisions in bills
of lading which would have that effect.42 The Court will probably be
unwilling to construe the rule of proportional liability to require
cargo owners to absorb the loss in both-to-blame collisions.
An alternative is to continue the practice of treating vessels
mutually at fault as joint tortfeasors with respect to cargo, allowing
cargo to recover from the noncarrying vessel, which in turn may have
contribution from the carrying vessel. Rather than continuing the
current practice of pro rata contribution, however, Reliable Transfer
suggests that contribution, as well as liability, would be proportionate
to a vessel's degree of fault.4 3 Since no cargo or other third party
damages obtained in Reliable Transfer,4 the holding need not be read
as affecting the right of cargo to full recovery; moreover, full recovery

39. See note 28 supra; Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule in Collision at Sea,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1928). The Huger article assumed that this would be the effect of
adopting a comparative negligence rule, although the author also assumed that the
adoption would be the result of ratification of the 1910 Brussels Convention: "The
Maritime Convention rule will result in giving full and no doubt intended effect to the
Harter Act by doing away with the doctrine announced in the Chatahoochee [sic].
Id. at 544.
40. "Parties without fault, such as shippers and consignees, bear no part of the
loss in collision suits, and are entitled to full compensation for the damage which
they suffer .... ." The "Atlas," 93 U.S. 302, 319 (1876). See United States v. Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952). This is in sharp contrast to judicial attitudes toward
the divided damages rule, which was apparently accepted without justification. See, e.g.,
The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
41. The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
42. United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952). See note 37 supra.
t 43. Thus, if vessels A and B collide, A is 75% at fault and B is 25% at fault, and
the cargo on vessel A is damaged to the the extent of $10,000, the cargo would collect
its full measure of damages from vessel B. Vessel B would then collect $7500 as contribution from vessel A.
44. The suit involved only damage to the Whalen. United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 398 (1975).
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with comparative contribution would indirectly implement the pre45
cise terms of the holding.
Comparative contribution is already a part of the tort law of several
states. 46 Wisconsin and Maine became comparative contribution jurisdictions4 7 following adoption of comparative negligence statutes. In
addition,- five jurisdictions that do not apply comparative negligence
between plaintiff and defendant allow comparative contribution. In
1961 the Supreme Court of Hawaii approved a 65 percent contribution
award pursuant to a statute which allows for unequal shares when
equal division would be inequitable.4s A similar rule is followed by
Arkansas, 49 Delaware,50 and South Dakota. 5' The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has adopted a common law rule of
comparative contribution for the Virgin Islands in a context of settle45. See note 38 supra.
46. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184 (1973).
47. Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1962); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d
169 (Me. 1971). In Bielski the court described contribution as an equitable doctrine
designed to remedy the problem of one tortfeasor bearing an unjust proportion of a
common liability.
If the doctrine is to do equity, there is no reason in logic or in natural justice
why the shares of common liability of joint tortfeasors should not be translated
into the percentage of the causal negligence which contributed to the injury. This
is merely a refinement of the equitable principle. It is difficult to justify, either
on a layman's sense of justice or on natural justice, why a joint tortfeasor who is
5% causally negligent should only recover 50% of the amount he paid to the
plaintiff from a co-tortfeasor who is 95% causally negligent, and conversely why
the defendant who is found 5% causally negligent should be required to pay
50% of the loss by way of reimbursement to the co-tortfeasor who is 95%
negligent.
114 N.W.2d at 109.
In Packard, the Maine court cited Bielski with approval, but also noted that the
statute which established comparative negligence in Maine had been amended in 1969
and quoted the statute:
"In a case involving multi-party defendants, each defendant shall be jointly
and severally liable to the plaintiff for the full amount of the plaintiff's damages.
However, any defendant shall have the right through the use of special interrogatories to request of the jury the percentage of fault contributed by each
defendant."
274 A.2d at 180, quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1974). The court concluded that the legislature intended to establish comparative contribution. See also Note,
Comparative Negligence and Comparative Contribution in Maine: The Need for Guidelines, 24 ME. L. REV. 243 (1972).
48. Mitchell v. Branch, 363 P.2d 969 (Hawaii 1961). Hawaii had enacted a version
of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-12 (1974
Supp.), but still applied the doctrine of contributory negligence in 1961. Hawaii adopted
comparative negligence in 1969. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 663-31 (1974 Supp.).
49. Burks Motors, Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 466 S.W.2d 907 (Ark. 1971);
AaK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (1967).
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6302 (1974).
51. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-8-15 (1967).
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ment and contribution. 52 Of the comparative negligence states,
Florida,5' Mississippi, Minnesota, Nebraska, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Vermont5 4 do not have comparative contribution.
The Chattahoochee principle of full recovery by innocent third
parties and the Reliable Transfer principle of proportional responsibility for damages would both be maintained by allowing cargo owners
to recover in full from the noncarrying vessel and providing for comparative contribution. Admittedly, such an approach would avoid enforcement of the provisions of COGSA and the Harter Act which relieve shipowners of liability. That is nothing new, however; it is precisely what the courts have been doing since The Chattahoochee 55
This proposal does nothing to ameliorate the harsh effects of the
Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act.5 6 Commentators generally
agree that the act represents an idea whose time has come-and gone."
52. Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967).
53. Until June 13, 1975, when Florida's version of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-108, § 1 (§ 768.31) took effect, Florida had no
contribution among tortfeasors. The Florida Supreme Court indicated in Lincenberg
v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975), that it might have overruled the no contribution
principle even without the statute, on the basis that prohibiting contribution is inconsistent with the equitable principles of comparative negligence announced in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). The statute provides that contribution shall
be on a pro rata basis, and that in determining tortfeasors' shares:
(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall not be -considered;
(b) If equity requires the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute
a single share; and
(c) Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.
Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-108, § 1 (§ 768.31(3)).
It is impossible to say whether, absent the statute, the court might have instituted
a rule of comparative contribution. In view of the statute's requirement of pro rata
shares, however, the court held in Lincenberg that a determination of comparative fault
among tortfeasors is not necessary. In a specially concurring opinion, Justice Boyd argued
that §§ (a) and (c) of § 768.31(3) are in conflict, and that "the two sections considered
together would require the relative degrees of fault of joint tortfeasors be considered by
the jury and court in fixing liability .... " Lincenberg v. Issen, supra, at 394.
54. New Hampshire and Vermont do not apply joint and several liability to tortfeasors. Thus a plaintiff may recover from each defendant only the proportion of damage
attributable to that defendant. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7a (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1036 (1973).
55. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
56. Consider the following situation: Vessels A and B collide. A is 90% at fault; B
is 10% at fault. A sinks and is a total loss. The owner of cargo carried by A sues B, recovering $50,000. Under comparative contribution, B is entitled to recover $45,000 from
A. Because A's owner may limit his liability to the value of the vessel at the end of
the voyage, B collects nothing. So far as liability for cargo damage is concerned, Reliable Transfer does not remedy all the inequities.
57. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 822: "[T9he Limitation Act, passed
in the era before the corporation had become the standard form of business organization
and before present forms of insurance protection (such as Protection and Indemnity
Insurance) were available, shows increasing signs of economic obsolescence." See also
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Its purposes, as well as that of international uniformity of laws, would

5
be better served by a single statute modeled after the British law, "
which allows shipowners to limit their liability without entirely depriving claimants of recovery.
It is difficult to justify COGSA and Harter Act provisions abrogating
cargo owners' right to recover damages. The chief virtue of those provisions has been the ability of the courts to circumvent them through
the rule of The Chattahoochee. Statutory reform, of course, requires
congressional action. Until it is forthcoming, the courts may only apply
the laws to achieve substantial justice whenever possible. Reliable
Transfer, by replacing the divided damages rule with comparative
negligence, helps to facilitate that task. The next step should be comparative contribution.

EDWARD P. NICKINSON, III

Constitutional Law-DuE

PROCESS-POSTJUDGMENT

MENT PROCEDURE THAT GIVES DEBTOR No NOTICE

WAGE

GARNISH-

OR OPPORTUNITY

To ASSERT STATUTORY EXEMPTION PRIOR TO GARNISHMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023
(M.D. Fla. 1974).
On July 13, 1973, a judgment was entered for Liberty Loan Corporation of Duval against Etta Jane Brown and her husband Saul F. Brown.
On July 25, 1973, a motion for garnishment after judgment was filed by
Liberty Loan and a writ of garnishment was issued by the clerk of the
circuit and county courts. The motion for garnishment was made and
the writ of garnishment was issued pursuant to sections 77.01 and
77.03 of the Florida Statutes. The writ was served on Etta Brown's
employer, Baby's Best Diaper Service, which was required to withhold
a portion of her wages. After notice was received from her employer,
she filed an affidavit of exemption pursuant to section 222.12, Florida
Statutes, stating that she was the head of a family and that the money
attached was for personal labor and services. Liberty Loan denied the
Eyer, note 17 supra; Thede, Statutory Limitations (Other Than Harter and COGSA) of
Carrier'sLiability to Cargo-Limitationof Liability and the Fire Statute, 45 TUL. L. REV.
959 (1971).

58.

See note 25 supra.

